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Introduction 
The purpose of the minimum wage in the countries of the European Union (EU) is 
threefold: to ensure that workers at the low end of the earnings distribution receive a “decent” 
or “living wage” that will reduce both poverty and wage inequality, to “curb exploitation of 
vulnerable workers,” and to reduce unemployment by being an incentive to work (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2007). In fact, Schulten 
(2008:421) notes that “the notion of Social Europe is usually taken to entail the payment of 
fair wages, defined as at least a minimum sufficient for a decent standard of living.”  
 In addition to protecting workers’ right to adequate financial resources, the EU is also 
concerned with the protection of workers’ time. These goals were outlined in detail in a 2003 
publication of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (EuroFound), "A New Organization of Time over Working Life." This publication 
identifies income and social security, work/life balance, and time sovereignty as three 
important factors that contribute to a worker's quality of life. EuroFound (2003: 55-6) defines 
work/life balance as "an individual's attempt to find suitable time arrangements and time 
options that allow the best possible coordination of requirements of work with time 
requirements for personal life." In other words, a worker should have time outside of work, as 
well as control over that time, to allocate to the social and personal activities that he or she 
wishes. This concept is further described in the concept of time sovereignty which EuroFound 
(2003:58) defines as "the right and ability of individuals to determine time allocation to a 
large extent (quantitatively as well as qualitatively) throughout their whole life and in all 
fields of life, not just in working life.” Time sovereignty is seen as being crucial to workers' 
quality of life and is a “central point of reference for planning life flexibility in a dynamic 
society.” Thus, the EU posits free time, and the ability to control that free time, as crucial to 
having a decent standard of living.  
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Given the above, the EU seems to espouse twin goals for the minimum wage: to 
provide workers a decent wage while also allowing them adequate time sovereignty. The 
ability to accomplish both of these goals is seen by the EU as indicating a good quality of life. 
As such, the governing body of the EU has determined in their vision of "Social Europe" that 
workers will be able to achieve material prosperity (i.e. a "decent wage") while still having 
free time to dedicate to social and personal activities (i.e. time sovereignty). While there is 
considerable variation in the wealth of the EU (e.g. annual median incomes for a single 
person as high as €31,635 in Luxembourg and as low as €1,883 in Romania), since the EU 
holds these twin goals up as rights they should be attainable for all workers across the EU, 
regardless of the relative economic situation of their home country. One goal of this project is 
to determine if minimum wage workers can actually meet those twin goals given both legal 
and natural limits on their working time.  
 
Research Questions 
The primary research question I wish to explore is:  
RQ1: Given that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
protects workers’ rights to both material prosperity and temporal 
sovereignty, is the fulfillment of both of these goals possible for minimum 
wage workers in practice?  
 
Are minimum wage workers in the EU actually able to both earn a decent living and have 
time to devote to issues outside of work, or must one be sacrificed in order for the other to be 
achieved? For the purposes of this study, the income threshold that I will use is the poverty 
threshold because it is the minimum threshold at which workers in the EU should be able to 
fulfill both of the twin goals, i.e. it is the minimally acceptable income for achievement of 
material prosperity. If minimum wage workers cannot meet this threshold they are not 
meeting the measure of a decent standard of living and thus are unable to fulfill at least one of 
the twin goals. The second of these twin goals, time sovereignty, I define as the situation 
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where a minimum wage worker must work any more than one full-time job to meet this 
minimum standard of living.  
 In addition to the above, I will also explore whether workers’ ability to reach the given 
thresholds changes over time. Some change over time is expected given that increases in the 
minimum wage are sometimes infrequent and may not necessarily keep pace with inflation. 
However, it is important to understand whether this change over time negatively impacts a 
worker’s ability to fulfill the twin goals of minimal material prosperity and time sovereignty. 
This informs my second research question: 
RQ2: Is there significant change over time in the number of hours necessary 
to meet the minimum standard of a decent life?     
 
This question will allow me to determine the current situation of minimum wage workers in 
the EU, whether those workers can actually meet the EU’s twin goals, and what that 
relationship has looked like over time. This may provide insight into the future ability of 
minimum wage workers to meet those goals as well as whether the current situation is tenable 
or not. Minimum wage workers in the EU should be able to meet the twin goals from year to 
year. If this is not the case, i.e. if their ability to earn the poverty threshold is negatively 
impacted by the fluctuating value of the minimum wage, this is a problem.    
  
 
Literature Review 
 There is a long tradition within the field of sociology that argues for the importance of 
time. Fundamental to this tradition are the theories of Karl Marx who used the importance of 
time to problematize capitalism as an economic system. Two aspects of Marxist theory in 
particular inform this project: first, that the material realities of work, of which time is an 
essential factor, are important, and second, that if allowed to operate unregulated or 
disembedded from society, the market will devour workers’ time in its unending quest to 
increase surplus-value.  
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 At the root of Marx’s theory is his materialist conception of history, i.e. that “the 
premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from 
which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their 
activity and material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already 
existing and those produced by their activity” (Marx & Kamenka 1983:163, emphasis added). 
In other words, unlike classical economists who speak of profit and commodities in an 
abstract manner, Marx emphasizes how these economic factors are the result of real people 
performing real work under a specific set of social conditions, one of which is working time. 
In Capital, Marx further stresses the material aspect of the labor process by asserting that 
“labor is, first of all, a process between man and nature…he confronts the materials of nature 
as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his 
arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to 
his own needs” (1867:283-4). For Marx, work is not an abstract process disassociated from 
actual human experience; instead, it is the result of quite real people engaging in the material 
world. 
 Time is a particularly important aspect of the labor process for Marx. In fact, he 
dedicates an entire chapter of Capital to a discussion of the working day and working hours.
1
 
In general terms, for Marx time is the medium through which we develop our species being.  
As he puts it, “Time is the room of human development. A man who has no free time to 
dispose of, whose whole lifetime apart from the mere physical interruptions by sleep, meals, 
and so forth, is absorbed by his labor for the capitalist, is less than a beast of burden. He is a 
mere machine for producing Foreign Wealth, broken in body and brutalized in mind” (Marx 
& Kamenka 1983:422). Without time for development, humans are reduced to the level of 
                                                          
1
 As will be seen below, time is also a crucial factor in Marx's conception of surplus value/exploitation. Surplus 
value can only be generated if workers labor for longer than is necessary to reproduce their labor costs. 
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machines. Thus, for Marx time is something that must be protected in order that it can be 
dedicated to our development.       
 Under the capitalist system, the protection of workers’ time becomes necessary 
because of capitalism’s “voracious appetite for surplus labor” and surplus-value, i.e. the value 
a worker produces additional to what is necessary to pay his or her wages (Marx 1867:344). 
In Capital, Marx states that, “capital has one sole driving force, the drive to valorize itself, to 
create surplus-value, to make its constant part, the means of production, absorb the greatest 
possible amount of surplus labour. Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by 
sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks…the capitalist appetite for 
surplus labour appears in the drive for an unlimited extension of the working day” (1867:342, 
346). That is, when the capitalist system is left to self-regulate and proceed unhindered, the 
result is the total consumption of a worker’s time in its incessant effort to maximize surplus-
value. Marx argues that eventually, the capitalist will consume so much of workers’ time that 
they will not have sufficient time to ‘recharge’ before the next working shift, resulting not 
only in the degradation of their labor but also the loss of their humanity.  
In support of Marx’s theory regarding the importance of the relationship between 
working time and degradation of the worker, a number of studies have shown that increased 
working time, especially excessive overtime (defined as any overtime that exceeds the 
maximum 48 hour work week) is related to a host of negative physical, psychological, 
ecological, and productive side effects (Freyssinet & Michon 2003). Seo (2011:4) states that 
"it is empirically proven that a work week of over 50 hours is detrimental to health" and that 
"adequate leisure (non-work) time is necessary for the wellbeing of workers." Spurgeon 
(2003) found that working for more than 50 hours per week increases the risk of mental health 
problems, cardiovascular disease, musculoskeletal disorders, and "health-threatening coping 
behaviors" like smoking and a poor diet. In their analysis, Wirtz and Nachreiner (2010:1128-
Ragon 7 
 
29) found that ailments such as "sleep problems, stomach ache, or irritability" increased with 
longer working hours and work at unusual times. Additionally, Wirtz and Nachreiner 
(2010:1129) show that "the more hours one works and the more often working time is located 
at unfavorable times, the more work-life balance deteriorates." This is an important finding in 
that it demonstrates that longer working hours not only have negative effects on worker 
health, which affects quality of life in obvious ways, but also negatively impacts both 
work/life balance and time sovereignty.  
Writing nearly a century after Marx, Karl Polanyi (1944) also argued for the 
importance of working time and recognized the same concerns regarding capitalism’s 
propensity to usurp that time thereby degrading workers’ humanity. But unlike Marx, Polanyi 
saw the market as something that could be tamed and controlled by society. For Polanyi, the 
ideal situation is one in which “the economic system is, in effect, a mere function of social 
organization” (Polanyi 1944:52). In other words, for Polanyi it is imperative that society 
regulates the economic system in order to protect itself from the ravages of a market society.  
If a society fails to do this, Polanyi believes that this will usher in waves upon waves of what 
he calls "social dislocations" that will ultimately destroy society itself (e.g. the corruption of 
land, labor, and money through the elimination of protective working legislation, destruction 
of and disregard for the environment in the pursuit of capital, etc.). Rather than focusing on 
the effects of a long working day, then, Polanyi decried the volatility of the market and we 
can see drastic changes in working time as one type of social dislocation. In reaction to these 
social dislocations, society attempts to protect itself with legislation, much like the EU has 
done.   
The European Union recognizes the need to protect a worker’s time from the ravages 
of the free market and as a result have attempted to embed the market within society. Towards 
this end, the EU has established supranational legal limits on working time (Minimum Wages 
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in Europe: Background Paper 2007). Directive 2003/88/EC published in November 2003 
establishes workers’ rights to daily and weekly rest periods, minimum annual leave of four 
weeks, maximum weekly working time of 48 hours, and protection from unnecessary or 
unduly long periods of night work (Official Journal of the EU 2003). These legal measures 
are designed to retain society’s control over the market and in doing so protect workers from 
its voracious appetite for their time.  
 It is through the lens of these theories that we can view the relationship between 
working time and the minimum wage in the European Union. If this study does in fact reveal 
that minimum wage workers must spend unreasonable or large parts of the day working 
simply to reach the baseline of a decent living (i.e. the poverty threshold), they are not 
afforded space for human development. More importantly, this would mean that these 
countries are failing to meet the twin goals of a decent living and time sovereignty which the 
EU valorizes in supranational legislation and theory.    
As we have seen, the issue of working time is and has been an important subject for 
sociological theorists nearly as long as the discipline has existed. However, when surveying 
the literature on the minimum wage we find that the issue of time has largely been ignored in 
favor of one of three themes: the minimum wage's effects on unemployment, its effect on 
wage inequality and poverty, and its importance as part of the vision of Social Europe. Given 
their importance to the minimum wage literature, it is worth exploring these themes in detail.    
 
Unemployment Effects 
 The most common focus of studies surrounding the minimum wage in the European 
Union is the effect that it has on unemployment. While a number of these studies note that the 
textbook economic view of the minimum wage is that it leads to increased unemployment 
(Mixon 1978:67; Dolado et al. 1996:320; Machin & Manning 1997:734; Stewart 2004:C10; 
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Pedace & Rohn 2011:57), most have actually found little to no effect of the minimum wage 
on employment, positive or negative. Dolado et al. (1996:320) is one widely cited example of 
research whose aim was to “assess the effect of minimum wages in Europe, cutting through 
the emotive positions of proponents and opponents to offer a more balanced assessment of its 
impact in different countries.” The authors examined the impact of the minimum wage on 
employment and the Kaitz index in four representative countries: France, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the UK. This study concludes that “it is surprisingly hard to find strong evidence 
of any adverse employment effects of minimum wages in situations where many 
commentators are firmly convinced (rightly or wrongly) that the job losses exist” (Dolado et 
al. 1996:357). In a similar study published the following year, Machin & Manning (1997) 
examined the effects of the minimum wage on both unemployment and wage distribution. 
Studying the same four countries as Dolado at al. (1996), Machin & Manning (1997:741) 
similarly conclude that there is “little evidence that minimum wages have a bad effect on 
jobs.” Providing further support for the seemingly insignificant effect of the minimum wage 
on employment is Stewart (2004:C116) whose study of the employment effects of the 
introduction of the national minimum wage in the UK yielded that “no significant adverse 
effect on employment is found for either the introduction or the upratings for any of the 
demographic groups considered.”2 A more recent study undertaken by Metcalf (2008:489) 
attempts to explain why the minimum wage in the UK has “raised the real and relative pay of 
low wage workers, narrowed the gender pay gap and now covers around 1-worker-in-10” but 
has provided “little or no evidence of any employment effects.” He concludes by affirming 
that his own study supports the conclusions of previous studies regarding the nil impact on 
employment. It is interesting to note that the UK National Minimum Wage Low Pay 
Commission Report (2012:55) finds that the national minimum wage has actually had a 
                                                          
2
 It is important to note that because it provided a natural experiment of minimum wage effects, the majority of 
European minimum wage studies have focused on the UK. There are very few studies that focus on the EU as a 
whole, so this study will also contribute to that literature. 
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positive impact on employment; that “employment rates of many of the groups expected to be 
most affected by the minimum wage have increased since its introduction.” However, in a 
subsequent review of the research, the report notes that “the general consensus of the research 
is that the NMW has not significantly affected employment” (Low Pay Commission Report 
2012:56).  
 
Inequality and Poverty Effects 
 A second common theme addressed by the literature is the effect of the minimum 
wage on wage and social inequality and poverty in the European Union. In a summary of the 
effect of the minimum wage on the incidence of low pay in the EU, the European 
Commission’s 2010 Industrial Relations in Europe Report (2010:144) found that the 
minimum wage has shown a declining ability to impact the incidence of low pay. The report 
states that “the countries with the highest level of low pay all have a statutory minimum 
wage” and that “in over half of the countries concerned, the statutory minimum wage lost 
value compared to the average wage during the 2000s” suggesting a “declining capacity to 
prevent low pay from emerging.” A similar conclusion was reached by Manning & Dickens 
(2002:50) who determined that as a result of the weaknesses in statistics of hourly pay in the 
UK, “there remains very considerable uncertainty about the true impact of the NMW.” This is 
interesting given that other studies, including the 2012 National Minimum Wage Low Pay 
Commission Report of the UK, have found that the minimum wage does have a significant 
positive impact on the incidence of low pay and wage dispersion (Machin & Manning 
1997:741; Machin et al. 2003:154; Lucifora et al. 2005:289; Dickens & Manning 2004:624; 
Metcalf 2008:492, Fanti & Gori 2011).  
 Machin & Manning (1997:741) argue that based on their study of the economic effects 
of the minimum wage in France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK, minimum wages “have 
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an equalizing impact on the distribution of income among families with someone in work.” 
However, they note the difficulty in obtaining accurate statistics and of comparing effects 
across a range of countries (Machin & Manning 1997:741). Similarly, in a review of low pay 
in Europe, Lucifora et al. (2005:289) show that wage regulations like the minimum wage 
“have a significant impact on low-wage employment” and that “high minimum wages lower 
dispersion at the bottom end of the distribution.” Machin et al. (2003:154) duplicate these 
results but in a much smaller setting, that of low paid workers in the residential care home 
industry. The results of this study suggest that “the minimum wage raised the wages of a large 
number of care home workers, causing a very big wage compression of the lower end of the 
wage distribution, thereby strongly reducing wage inequality.” Fanti & Gori (2011:81) reach 
the same conclusion in their study of the impact of the minimum wage on overall economic 
growth.  
In contrast, Dickens & Manning (2004:624) found that although the minimum wage 
“has been effective in raising the earnings of the lowest paid workers” in the UK, the overall 
effect is small, “with no detectable effect on earnings at the 10th percentile even when the 
effect of the NMW was largest.” As is apparent from studies of the minimum wage effect on 
both employment and wage inequality, various studies have found support for both the 
defending and opposing side of the argument, and in the words of Manning & Dickens 
(2002:50), “the honest conclusion is that there remains very considerable uncertainty about 
the true impact of the NMW.”     
 
Vision of Social Europe  
 Another theme present in European minimum wage literature is that of the role of the 
minimum wage in the realization of the “Vision of Social Europe” (Schulten et al. 2005; 
Schulten & Watt 2007:1; Schulten 2008:422; Levin-Waldman 2003:487; European 
Ragon 12 
 
Commission 2010:3). The concept of “Social Europe” refers to the idea that “the European 
Union is founded on the principle of social rights advancing alongside economic growth and 
sustainable development. EU Member States share common values, which together make 
Europe a unique model of society in the global context” (European Trade Union Federation 
2007). Thorsten Schulten has emerged as the primary contributor to this branch of the 
literature with his argument that the creation of a European minimum wage is important not 
only to “lend substance to the idea of a ‘Social Europe,’” but also to “help to reverse the 
increasing loss of trust and legitimacy in the EU among growing sections of European labor” 
(Schulten & Watt 2007:1). Schulten & Watt (2007:5) argue that given the commitment of the 
EU to promoting “fair and equitable wages” for all workers, an EU level minimum wage is 
the best way to promote Social Europe as well as “one way to avoid a potential ‘race to the 
bottom’ or beggary-thy-neighbour approach” in the area of migration and social dumping in 
the EU. The authors further argue that EU countries should “have the goal of implementing a 
framework in which national minimum wages would be protected from erosion and the 
lowest-paid workers in each European country assured a decent standard of living and their 
societies a minimum of social cohesion” (Schulten & Watt 2007:8). Schulten (2008:421) 
represents a more detailed development of the argument set forth in Schulten & Watt (2007) 
for a “coordinated minimum wage policy at European level.” Further argument for the 
importance of the minimum wage in a development of Social Europe can be found in Levin-
Waldman (2003). While this paper is not directed specifically at the European Union, the 
author argues in favor of the minimum wage because it “furthers the ends of democratic 
society” (Levin-Waldman 2003:488). Levin-Waldman (2003: 488-9) proposes that “the 
minimum wage is not just a matter of increasing the purchasing power of those at the bottom; 
it is also about what constitutes a fair and just society” and towards that end it serves the very 
goals that Social Europe stands for: “that low-wage workers may achieve greater equality of 
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standing with their peers to the extent that income inequality is at all lessened; their autonomy 
as individuals is enhanced through higher wages, which in turn enables them to claim the 
benefits of citizenship and participate more effectively in the democratic process; it fosters 
greater economic development in that it raises the overall wage structure of a region and 
perhaps the productivity of that region.”  
As can be seen from the above, the issue of time is largely ignored by most of the 
minimum wage literature.  The exceptions to this are some authors who have addressed the 
minimum wage’s effects on working time. However, what is notable about these works is that 
they focus on the issue of time primarily from the perspective of employers. For example, 
although Metcalf (2008) does discuss briefly a reduction in hours worked as a result of the 
introduction of the national minimum wage, this is from the perspective of the employer, not 
workers themselves. Robinson & Wadsworth (2007:553) found in their study of the 
introduction of the minimum wage in the UK that “there is little evidence to suggest that the 
extra pay provided by the introduction of the minimum wage was sufficient to affect the 
incidence of second job holding significantly.” Unlike previous studies, the authors do 
address the issue of work hours from the perspective of the worker and conclude that “while 
hours of work may have fallen in second jobs..., hours of work in the main job have, if 
anything, risen for those affected by the NMW” (Robinson & Wadsworth 2007:569). So 
while there have been studies that address working time, there has been no significant 
scholarship regarding the number of hours minimum wage workers must work in order to 
achieve various income thresholds. 
 Given the amount and variety of literature surrounding minimum wage policy in the 
European Union and the importance that EU labor policy accords to workers’ time, it is 
striking that there is virtually no literature that addresses the relationship between the 
minimum wage and the time needed to achieve certain income thresholds in the EU. This 
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study will attempt to address this gap in the literature. This is important because while there is 
considerable scholarship addressing the impact of the minimum wage on macro-economic 
variables, there is a lack of literature that examines the effects of the minimum wage on 
workers. Also, the existing literature focuses primarily on just a few countries, specifically the 
UK, Spain, France, and the Netherlands, and there is little written about the EU as a whole. 
This study will also help us get a broader sense of minimum wage work in the EU.  
 
Methods 
To address the aforementioned research questions, I focus on the 20 countries in the 
EU that have national statutory minimum wages, i.e. minimum wages that are set at the state 
level and that apply to all sectors of the economy. This includes: Belgium, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. Countries where the minimum wage is primarily determined by collective 
bargaining are excluded from this study. The following data was collected for each of the 20 
EU countries with national statutory minimum wages over the period of 1999-2011: monthly 
minimum wage levels and poverty thresholds for single worker and four person family units 
(Eurostat Population and Social Conditions database), minimum wage and working time 
legislation (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and 
United states Department of State Country Reports), and legally mandated vacation time 
(OECD and International Labor Organization databases).  
In order to answer RQ1, data for each country’s minimum wage was collected from 
Eurostat, the statistical organ of the EU. Since the minimum wage is given as a monthly 
measurement, it was converted to an hourly measure. This was necessary in order to 
determine the number of working hours necessary per week to achieve the poverty threshold. 
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The EU sets the standard workweek at 40 hours, but within the 20 countries studied some 
have shorter standard workweeks (e.g. the standard workweek in Belgium is 38 hours), so the 
monthly minimum wage was converted to an hourly wage using the standard workweek for 
each country. To do this, each monthly minimum wage figure was divided by the legally 
defined standard number of monthly working hours in order to determine the hourly wage. 
Below is an example calculation:  
Ex. 1: Hourly Minimum Wage, Belgium 2011:  
38 hour standard workweek * 4 weeks/month = 152 hours/month 
€1415.24 monthly minimum wage/152 hours/month = €9.31/hour 
A standard measure of the poverty threshold in euros was collected from Eurostat for 
each country as well. For this study, I have chosen to focus specifically on the single worker 
and the four person family with two workers and two dependent children. These were chosen 
in part because they are two common worker units that the EU uses to measure various 
figures including poverty thresholds and minimum wages. Additionally, examining these 
working units will give us a sense of whether the minimum wage provides a minimally decent 
standard of living for both single people and families. 
The hourly minimum wage figures and the poverty thresholds were then used to 
calculate the number of hours that each minimum wage-earning working unit must work per 
week in order to achieve the poverty threshold. This number assumes a 48 hour workweek 
year, but this is not standard across all countries. To adjust for this we included an adjustment 
for the mandatory paid vacation time provided for in EU labor laws. Since our aim is to 
determine the actual number of necessary working hours, i.e. the number of hours a worker 
must spend working to achieve the poverty threshold, it was necessary to factor in paid 
vacation time when workers would be earning income but not actually working. The EU 
mandates that all workers are entitled to a minimum of 20 days (4 weeks) of paid vacation 
time per year. Our basic calculation assumes 20 days of paid vacation and a 48 workweek 
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year, but some countries require more paid vacation, e.g. France where the standard paid 
vacation time is 41 calendar days, and this was accounted for by changing the number of 
mandatory yearly vacation hours as used in the example equation below. Vacation time data 
was collected from the International Labor Organization. The basic calculation for this 
involves first dividing the poverty threshold by the minimum wage to determine the total 
number of hours necessary to earn that threshold in one year. The total number of hours is 
then adjusted for vacation time by subtracting the mandatory vacation time as measured in 
hours. This figure is then divided by the total legal number of workweeks allowed by each 
country’s labor laws based on mandatory vacation time in order to determine how many hours 
per week the worker must average in order to achieve the poverty threshold.  The following is 
a sample calculation: 
Ex. 2: Total Hours Worked for Single Worker Poverty Threshold: Belgium 2011 
€12,005.00 poverty threshold/€9.31 hourly minimum wage = 1289.47 hours per year 
 (1289.47 yearly hours – 240 mandatory yearly vacation hours)/46 standard yearly work 
weeks = 22.81 hours worked per week  
 
In order to answer RQ2, the above calculations were performed for each country over the 
period of 1999-2011, where data was available, and the results were used to examine change over 
time. In order to do this, volatility was chosen as the measure of change. The volatility of the 
number of weekly hours worked to achieve a given threshold was determined by taking the 
standard deviation of the number of hours over the given period. This figure allows us to 
determine by how many hours the number of hours necessary to achieve the poverty threshold 
fluctuated from year to year over the given time period. Understanding the magnitude of this 
fluctuation helps us to determine whether the change in necessary hours worked from year to year 
negatively impacts the ability of a minimum wage worker to earn the poverty threshold and thus 
fulfill the EU’s twin goals.   
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Results 
Is fulfillment of both a decent standard of living and time sovereignty possible? 
The poverty threshold represents the minimum amount of income at which a worker 
can be said to have an acceptable standard of living. Are minimum wage workers in the EU 
able to achieve this income without jeopardizing their time sovereignty?  The calculations to 
determine total number of hours necessary to achieve the poverty threshold were performed 
for both a single worker unit and a four person family unit comprised of two workers and two 
dependent children. In order to contextualize the number of weekly working hours they were 
converted to the corresponding number of standard 40-hour workweeks. This means, for 
example, that 1.0 corresponds to 40 hours while .5 corresponds to 20 hours, etc. 
As can be seen from Table 1, there is significant variation between countries regarding 
the number of hours minimum wage workers must work to achieve the poverty threshold. To 
help contextualize these numbers, I divide these countries into three groups based on their 
relationship to achievement of the twin goals. The first group - Group 1 - is defined as less 
than .75 full-time jobs, or 30 hours, for a single worker and less than 1.5 full-time jobs, or 60 
hours, for a four person family. I label this category as "reasonable" in the sense that it 
includes countries in which achievement of the poverty threshold is not only possible within 
the confines of the standard 40 hour workweek, and thus does not require workers to violate 
their time sovereignty, but also leaves workers sufficient time where they can increase either 
their material prosperity (by working more) or their time sovereignty (by devoting their 
efforts to non-work issues). Workers can do either of these without jeopardizing either of the 
EU's twin goals. In other words, not only can workers in this group accomplish the EU's twin 
goals, but they also have a significant time ‘buffer’ which allows them to increase the time 
they devote to one of these goals without violating the other (e.g. if a worker can achieve the 
poverty threshold in 20 hours, this leaves him/her 20 hours of the standard workweek that can 
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be devoted either to increasing his/her income or sovereignty without his/her material 
prosperity or time sovereignty being violated).  
The second group - Group 2 – is defined as between .75 and 1 full-time jobs, or 
between 30 and 40 hours, for a single worker and between 1.5 and 2 full-time jobs, or 
between 60 and 80 hours, for a four person family, this leaves these workers less than 10 
hours per week with which to either increase their material prosperity .  This group can be 
considered "precarious” because it includes countries in which it is possible to achieve the 
poverty threshold but where workers have very little ability to improve their situation in terms 
of one of the twin goals (i.e. to increase their material prosperity or time sovereignty) without 
sacrificing the other goal. This group is quantitatively defined as working between .75 and 1 
full-time job, or between 30 and 40 hours, for a single worker and between 1.75 and 2 full-
time jobs, or between 70 and 80 hours, for a four person family, this leaves these workers less 
than 10 hours per week with which to either increase their material prosperity or expand their 
time sovereignty. If a worker in this category desired to increase either one of the twin goals, 
he or she would be forced to sacrifice the other.  
The third group - Group 3 - is seen as being "unreasonable" because it includes 
countries in which the simultaneous achievement of the twin goals is not possible. This group 
is quantitatively defined as greater than 1 full-time job, or 40 hours, for a single worker and 
greater than 2 full-time jobs, or 80 hours, for a four person family. Minimum wage workers in 
these countries are forced to sacrifice both twin goals because they do not have sufficient time 
to earn the poverty threshold. The three groups as listed in Table 1 represent the three 
situations regarding the ability of minimum wage workers to achieve the EU’s twin goals of a 
decent standard of living and time sovereignty.  
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Table 1. Number of 40-hour Workweeks to Achieve Poverty Threshold 
(2010) 
 Country  Single Worker Four Person Family 
Group 
1 
France 0.53 1.32 
Ireland 0.56 1.32 
Belgium 0.56 1.33 
Poland 0.60 1.36 
Greece 0.61 1.37 
Romania 0.62 1.45 
Netherlands 0.62 1.45 
Portugal 0.68 1.60 
Hungary 0.68 1.45 
Malta 0.69 1.60 
Group 
2 
Lithuania 0.78 1.80 
Spain 0.78 1.82 
Latvia* 0.81 1.32 
Luxembourg 0.84 1.94 
United Kingdom 0.87 1.95 
Slovenia 0.90 1.98 
Slovakia 0.91 1.86 
Estonia 0.95 2.08 
Group 
3 
Czech Republic 1.09 2.45 
Bulgaria 1.15 2.50 
 *Latvia falls into Group 1 in the case of a single worker. 
   
Group 1 countries, i.e. those where achievement of the twin goals is possible within 
the confines of a 40 hour week, is comprised of France, Ireland, Belgium, Poland, Greece, 
Romania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Hungary, and Malta. Within this group, the observed 
working hours range between .53 and .69 workweeks, or between 21 and 28 hours per week, 
in order to meet the minimum threshold for an acceptable standard of living. As such, this 
worker is able to achieve the threshold of a minimally decent standard of living while also 
having between 12 and 19 hours left over to dedicate him or herself to activities outside of the 
job or, if he or she so chooses, pick up additional hours in order to increase his or her material 
prosperity without compromising either of the EU's twin goals. For example, in Belgium a 
single person must work .56 standard 40-hour workweeks, or 22.4 hours per week, in order to 
achieve the poverty threshold. This leaves 17.6 hours of the standard workweek free for a 
minimum wage worker to work additional hours to increase his or her material prosperity or 
engage in non-work activities without either goal of the EU being violated.   
In the case of a four person family, the same country grouping applies with the 
addition of Latvia. In this case, the two workers in this family unit must work the equivalent 
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of between 1.32 and 1.60 full-time jobs per week, which is between 52 and 64 hours per 
week, in order to reach the poverty threshold. If the couple divides the hours evenly between 
them, this means that at minimum, that they would have to each work between 26 and 32 
hours in order to achieve the minimum standard of living (note that we assume that the dual-
earner couple will split the hours evenly between them in order to make this number 
comparable to that of a single worker simpler). As in the case of the single worker, this leaves 
adequate time for one or both workers to dedicate time to activities outside of work, or to 
work more in order to increase material prosperity without sacrificing the goal of time 
sovereignty. For example, in France a four person family must work 1.32 standard 40-hour 
workweeks, or 52.8 hours per week, in order to achieve the poverty threshold. Split evenly 
between the dual earner couple, this means that each worker would need to work 26.4 hours 
per week in order to reach the minimally decent standard of living. This means that each 
worker can achieve the goal of minimally decent standard of living while still having 13.6 
hours left to use in whatever way he or she desires without his/her time sovereignty being 
violated. For these workers the minimum wage allows for a very reasonable achievement of 
the EU’s twin goals.      
 As noted above, Group 2 countries are in a more precarious position. For a single 
worker, this group includes Lithuania, Spain, Latvia, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia. In these countries minimum wage workers are currently able 
to achieve the twin goals of a minimally materially prosperous life and time sovereignty, but 
there is very little leeway for increasing one of these goals without jeopardizing the other (i.e. 
the ability of these workers to increase their standard of living is limited since they can only 
work a few additional hours without their time sovereignty being violated. Similarly, if these 
workers increase their time sovereignty by more than a few hours a week, their ability to meet 
a minimally decent standard of living is jeopardized).  It is also the case that a relatively 
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minor change in the value of the minimum wage could jeopardize their ability to achieve both 
of these goals at once the number of hours they must work to earn the poverty threshold is 
already high and in some cases near the cut-off for Group 3. The observed range of hours in 
this Group are between .78 and .95 full-time jobs, or between 31 and 38 hours per week. 
Given that they are working nearly a full-time job to obtain the poverty threshold, this means 
that it would be difficult for these workers to increase their standard of living beyond that of a 
poverty income without sacrificing time sovereignty. Similarly, if workers decided to even 
moderately increase the amount of time they dedicate to non-work activities their ability to 
achieve the poverty threshold is potentially jeopardized. For example, in the United Kingdom 
a single worker must work .87 standard 40-hour workweeks, or 34.8 hours per week, in order 
to achieve the poverty threshold. This leaves a single worker only 5.2 hours per week to either 
dedicate to non-work activities and/or increase his/her material prosperity.  This means that if 
these workers are not to violate their right to time sovereignty, then they are forced to earn a 
near poverty-level income. Similarly, these workers cannot readily increase the level of their 
time sovereignty without jeopardizing their ability to earn a minimally decent standard of 
living.  
Additionally, as mentioned above, any change in the value of the minimum wage 
could result in minimum wage workers not being able to achieve the poverty threshold 
without jeopardizing their time sovereignty, thus moving them into Group 3. For example, a 
single worker in Estonia must work .98 full-time jobs, or 38 hours per week, just to earn the 
poverty threshold. This means that even a 5% (2 hour) decrease in the temporal value of the 
minimum wage would push workers there into Group 3.  
In the case of a four person family, Group 2 includes the aforementioned countries 
excluding Latvia. The observed range that a dual-earner couple must work is between 1.80 
and 1.98 full-time jobs, or between 72 and 79.2 hours per week, in order to achieve the 
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poverty threshold. This requires that, at minimum, both workers must work just under a full-
time job to earn the minimal standard of living. This again leaves workers very little time to 
either earn additional income above the poverty threshold without jeopardizing their time 
sovereignty, or to increase their time sovereignty without jeopardizing their standard of living. 
To illustrate this we can look at the UK once again where a four person family must work 
1.95 standard 40-hour workweeks, or 78 hours per week to achieve the poverty threshold. 
Split evenly between the dual-earner couple, each worker must work 39 hours per week 
simply to earn the bare minimum of a decent standard of living. This leaves these workers 
only 1 hour per week to increase their income and/or to devote to non-work activities if they 
do not wish to violate their time sovereignty.  
Also, as in the case of the single worker, this means that in the event of any change in 
the value of the minimum wage, their ability to achieve the poverty threshold may be 
compromised. Ultimately, while both single workers and dual-earner couples in this category 
are able to fulfill the twin goals of material prosperity and time sovereignty, their situation is 
precarious because in order to increase either goal (e.g. earn more to increase material 
prosperity or expand time sovereignty) they would be forced to sacrifice the other and given 
any significant change in the situation they may be plunged into the unreasonable or 
impossible category.  
 Group 3 includes those countries where it is unreasonable for minimum wage workers 
to achieve the poverty threshold. As mentioned earlier, I define unreasonable the situation in 
which any one worker must work in excess of one full-time job in order to achieve the 
poverty threshold and thus is unable to attain simultaneous achievement of the twin goals. In 
the case of a single worker, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic fall into the unreasonable 
category. As can be seen from Table 1, a single worker must work between 1.09 and 1.15 
full-time jobs, or between 43.6 and 46 hours per week, to achieve the poverty threshold, the 
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very minimum of a decent standard of living. In practical terms, this means that these workers 
must sacrifice their time sovereignty simply to achieve a poverty level income. These workers 
do not have any option to either work less – because they risk falling below the poverty 
threshold – while working more to improve their situation would only further jeopardize their 
time sovereignty.  
The situation of four person families in these countries, and in Estonia additionally, is 
even more concerning. The dual-earner couples in each of these countries must work in 
excess of two full-time jobs, between 2.08 and 2.5 jobs, or between 83.2 and 100 hours per 
week, simply to meet the poverty threshold. As a specific example, a dual-earner couple in 
Bulgaria must work 2.5 standard 40-hour work weeks, or 100 hours per week, simply to 
achieve the poverty threshold. Split evenly between the couple, each person must work 50 
hours per week to achieve the poverty threshold (this exceeds the maximum legal workweek 
and prevents minimum wage workers there from achieving the poverty threshold). As a result, 
these minimum wage workers are unable to simultaneously meet the twin goals of a 
minimally materially prosperous life and time sovereignty espoused by the EU.  
Given the above, we can see that there is considerable variation in the ability of 
minimum wage workers in those countries to meet the twin goals. In some countries 
achievement of the twin goals is reasonable and they are easily able to maintain both goals 
while in other countries workers may be forced to sacrifice one or both of the twin goals as a 
result of insufficient time. This is problematic given that achievement of the twin goals is 
supposed to be right guaranteed by the EU to all workers in all member countries. 
 
Is there significant change over time? 
We have seen how there is considerable variability regarding how long a minimum 
wage worker must work in order to achieve a minimal decent standard of living, i.e. in some 
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countries minimum wage workers are able to achieve the poverty threshold while maintaining 
their time sovereignty while in others minimum wage workers must sacrifice time sovereignty 
in order to maintain minimal material prosperity. This variability is shown in the context of 
just one year above, but is there variability in minimum wage workers’ ability to achieve the 
twin goals from year to year? This seems to be the case when we look at the data over time. 
For instance, while in 2010 Estonia fell into the precarious group (Group 2), the previous year 
Estonia was classified in the unreasonable group (Group 3). In order to get a greater sense of 
this change over time, I calculated the number of hours necessary to achieve the poverty 
threshold for both a single worker and a four person family each year that data was available 
between 1999 and 2011. The results of this are shown in Graphs 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b and Tables 
2 and 3 below.  
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Graph 1a: Weekly Hours Worked for the Poverty Threshold 
Single Worker - Group 1 
1999-2011 
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Graph 1b: Weekly Hours Worked for the Poverty Threshold 
Single Worker - Groups 2 & 3 
1999-2011 
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Graph 2a: Weekly Hours Worked for the Poverty Threshold 
Four Person Family - Group 1 
1999-2011 
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Graph 2b: Weekly Hours Worked for the Poverty Threshold 
Four Person Family - Groups 2 & 3 
1999-2011 
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Table 2. Total Hours Worked for Poverty Threshold - Single Worker 
          
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Volatility 
2 
Group 
Changes 
Belgium 21,67 22,20 22,98   21,24 20,98 21,95 22,44 22,45 22,01 22,38 22,59 22,81 0,58   
Group Changes 1 1 1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Romania 
        
24,81 24,20 25,03 24,79 22,88 0,78   
  
        
1 1 1 1 1   0 
Portugal 25,35 26,31 26,51 
  
28,41 28,89 28,43 28,14 28,73 27,43 27,19 25,49 1,22   
  1 1 1 
  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Greece 21,00 22,18 22,82 
 
23,72 24,71 24,87 24,42 24,60 23,87 24,78 24,40 22,13 1,23   
  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Netherlands 19,76 23,43 24,69 24,72 24,01 
 
22,76 23,02 23,98 25,24 25,17 24,80 24,47 1,45   
  1 1 1 1 1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Malta 
 
23,99 
    
26,86 26,90 26,86 28,63 29,67 27,43 28,73 1,62   
  
 
1 
    
1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Ireland 
  
25,55 
 
27,22 29,10 27,17 25,94 26,85 26,85 26,08 22,53   1,67   
  
  
1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1     0 
France 21,01 18,27 17,13 17,10 17,50 16,57 16,29 18,04 17,65 20,96 21,03 21,14 20,60 1,84   
  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Poland 
 
27,88 26,06 
   
21,04 23,39 25,33 23,19 29,85 24,12 25,49 2,48   
  
 
1 1 
   
1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Luxembourg 31,83 32,37 31,94 
 
32,93 33,70 34,02 34,54 33,35 34,70 34,00 33,72 32,27 0,95   
  2 2 2 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2   0 
United Kingdom 
 
38,68 39,95 35,69 34,65 
 
35,74 35,09 35,09 32,99 35,74 34,62 32,62 2,06   
  
 
2 2 2 2 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2   0 
Slovakia 
      
30,41 33,05 32,66 36,40 35,05 36,42 36,46 2,19   
  
      
2 2 2 2 2 2 2   0 
Slovenia 
 
33,70 33,42 31,97 31,77 
 
32,57 33,07 34,64 37,12 36,94 35,96 28,74 2,36   
  
 
2 2 2 2 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 1   1 
Lithuania 
 
29,86 28,43 
   
24,17 27,76 34,03 32,21 38,12 31,20 30,69 3,74   
  
 
1 1 
   
1 1 2 2 2 2 2   1 
Latvia 
 
39,09 
    
35,11 35,86 35,59 38,73 39,74 32,42 26,41 4,09   
  
 
2 
    
2 2 2 2 2 2 1   1 
Spain 26,59 29,18 31,82 32,91 33,76 35,35 31,52 32,55 32,32 33,21 32,72 31,36 29,41 2,26   
  1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1   2 
Estonia 
 
39,25 36,04 34,08 32,52 29,03 31,33 34,62 35,33 36,57 41,33 37,86 36,94 3,27   
  
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2   2 
Czech Republic 
  
39,02 
   
32,14 33,08 33,58 36,89 46,01 43,57 43,55 5,06   
  
  
2 
   
2 2 2 2 3 3 3   1 
Bulgaria 
 
56,89 49,36 46,43 46,71 44,25 37,26 30,49 28,83 35,28 42,76 45,83 43,96 7,71   
  
 
3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 2 3 3 3   4 
Hungary 
 
40,95 34,46 29,37 30,88 
 
25,82 27,29 26,35 28,55 31,68 27,34 28,51 4,19   
    3 2 1 2   1 1 1 1 2 1 1   6 
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Table 3. Total Hours Worked for Poverty Threshold - Four Person Family 
          
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Volatility2 
Total Group 
Changes 
Belgium 51,26 52,37 54,00   50,35 49,79 51,83 52,86 52,88 51,96 52,73 53,19 53,64 1,22   
  1 1 1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Romania 
        
57,82 56,55 58,30 57,80 53,79 1,64   
  
        
1 1 1 1 1   0 
Portugal 60,09 62,10 62,51 
  
66,52 67,51 66,57 65,94 67,18 64,45 63,94 60,36 2,57   
  1 1 1 
  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Greece 47,76 50,25 51,58 
 
53,49 55,55 55,91 54,96 55,33 53,79 55,70 54,90 50,14 2,59   
  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Netherlands 47,45 55,16 57,81 57,87 56,38 
 
53,75 54,30 56,32 58,95 58,82 58,04 57,35 3,05   
  1 1 1 1 1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Malta 
 
56,77 
    
62,81 62,89 62,81 66,52 68,70 64,00 66,72 3,39   
  
 
1 
    
1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Ireland 
  
59,18 
 
62,69 66,64 62,59 60,00 61,90 61,90 60,30 52,84   3,50   
  
  
1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1     0 
France 52,36 46,61 44,21 44,15 44,99 43,03 42,44 46,11 45,30 52,26 52,40 52,63 51,51 3,86   
  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Poland 
 
62,23 58,40 
   
47,85 52,77 56,87 52,36 66,36 54,33 57,20 5,22   
  
 
1 1 
   
1 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 
Luxembourg 73,49 74,62 73,72 
 
75,80 77,40 78,08 79,16 76,67 79,51 78,03 77,45 74,40 2,00   
  2 2 2 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2   0 
Slovenia 
 
74,44 73,85 70,80 70,38 
 
72,06 73,11 76,41 81,62 81,24 79,17 64,03 4,95   
  
 
2 2 2 2 
 
2 2 2 3 3 2 1   3 
Lithuania 
 
69,34 66,31 
   
57,37 64,92 78,07 74,24 86,67 72,13 71,07 7,85   
  
 
1 1 
   
1 1 2 2 3 2 2   3 
Slovakia 
      
67,52 73,07 72,24 80,11 77,26 80,16 80,21 4,59   
  
      
1 2 2 3 2 3 3   4 
Spain 62,92 68,34 73,90 76,17 77,96 81,31 73,27 75,44 74,95 76,82 75,78 72,93 68,83 4,74   
  1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1   4 
Estonia 
 
86,07 79,36 75,24 71,98 64,62 69,47 76,38 77,86 80,46 90,46 83,18 81,23 6,86   
  
 
3 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3   4 
Latvia 
 
85,74 
    
77,42 79,00 78,43 84,99 87,13 71,76 59,14 8,58   
  
 
3 
    
2 2 2 3 3 2 1   4 
Hungary 
 
86,53 72,89 62,21 65,38 
 
54,77 57,82 55,87 60,48 67,05 57,94 60,39 9,23   
  
 
3 2 1 1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1   2 
Czech Republic 
  
88,35 
   
73,87 75,87 76,91 83,86 103,00 97,91 97,84 10,62   
  
  
3 
   
2 2 2 3 3 3 3   2 
Bulgaria 
 
123,15 107,34 101,18 101,80 96,51 81,95 67,70 64,22 77,74 93,45 99,92 95,98 16,20   
  
 
3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 3 3 3   3 
United Kingdom 
 
86,55 89,20 80,25 78,08 
 
80,37 79,00 79,01 74,59 80,36 78,02 73,81 4,31   
  
 
3 3 3 2 
 
3 2 2 2 3 2 2   5 
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As can be seen from these graphs, there is not only great variation in the number of 
hours someone must work in order to achieve the poverty thresholds, but also significant 
differences in how stable these hours are on a year to year basis. To help make sense of this 
data, I contextualize it in two ways. The first is by examining how often the countries move 
between Groups 1, 2, and 3 based on the number of hours necessary to reach the poverty 
threshold. This measurement gives us a sense of the qualitative changes in the ability of 
minimum wage workers to meet the EU’s twin goals changes. 
In order to measure this I used the same group definitions as in the previous 
discussion of achievement of the poverty threshold: single worker (Group 1: >30 weekly 
hours, Group 2: 31-40 weekly hours, Group 3: >40 weekly hours) and four person family 
working unit (Group 1: 52 - 64 weekly hours, Group 2: 72 - 79 weekly hours, Group 3: 83.2 – 
100 weekly hours). I then labeled each year according to the corresponding group and 
counted each time a country changed from one group to another. For example, between 2000 
and 2004 minimum wage workers in Spain experienced two categorical changes, one 
between 2000 and 2001 (from Group 1 to Group 2) and another between 2003 and 2004 
(from Group 2 to Group 3), as visible below:  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total Group 
Changes 
Spain 1 2 2 2 3 2 
 
 
Each country was then assigned a number corresponding to the total number of group 
changes. The complete results of this can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 above in the column 
labeled ‘Total Group Changes.’ This sort of analysis is important because it highlights 
qualitative changes in the ability of minimum wage workers to achieve the EU’s twin goals 
(It is possible that from one year to the next a worker’s ability to earn the poverty threshold, 
Group change Group change = 2 group changes 
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and thus fulfill the twin goals, may change drastically; this qualitative measure helps us get a 
sense of how frequently these changes occur.)  
 While in theory the amount of hours necessary to achieve the poverty threshold and 
the relative stability of these hours are not necessarily related; it is possible for a country to 
require workers to work long hours to achieve the poverty threshold, but these required hours 
are stable over time, or vice versa. However, in practice what we find is that countries in 
Groups 2 and 3, those with the highest hours necessary to earn the poverty threshold, tend to 
also experience greater instability than Group 1 countries. This is shown below in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Poverty Country Groups and Volatility Scores 
 
Country  
Total Group Changes  
Single Worker 
Total Group Changes 
Four Person Family 
Group 
1 
France 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 
Poland 0 0 
Greece 0 0 
Romania 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 
Hungary 6 2 
Malta 0 0 
Group 
2 
Lithuania 1 3 
Spain 2 4 
Latvia 1 4 
Luxembourg 0 0 
United Kingdom 0 5 
Slovenia 1 3 
Slovakia 0 4 
Estonia  2 4 
Group 
3 
Czech Republic 1 2 
Bulgaria 4 3 
 
As can be seen from this table, Group 1 countries (with the exception of Hungary) did not 
experience any qualitative changes in their ability to meet these twin goals. This means that 
the value of the minimum wage was stable over time and these countries never experienced a 
change that was significant enough to affect their ability to fulfill the twin goals of a minimal 
level of material prosperity and time sovereignty.  
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In contrast, Group 2 and 3 countries generally experienced a number of qualitative 
changes in their ability to meet these goals.  For example, over the twelve year period 
studied, minimum wage workers in Bulgaria have experienced four qualitative shifts in their 
ability to achieve the poverty threshold, half of which represent a shift to a more precarious 
or unreasonable group and thus a decline in their ability to fulfill the EU’s twin goals. If we 
look at the two year period between 2007 and 2009 workers in Bulgaria went from the 
reasonable group in 2007, to the precarious group in 2008, and to the unreasonable group in 
2009. This means that in the space of two years these workers went from being able to fulfill 
the twin goals with relative ease to not being able to meet the poverty threshold despite 
working a full-time job. In practical terms, this means that there was considerable instability 
in the ability of these workers to have both time sovereignty and a minimally decent standard 
of living.   
For a four person family working unit these patterns look much the same; those 
countries where minimum wage workers experience higher necessary working hours and thus 
limited ability to achieve the EU’s twin goals tend also to experience more qualitative shifts 
between groups. For example, in Belgium where the average hours necessary to achieve the 
poverty threshold for each member of a dual earner couple is about 22 (Group 1), minimum 
wage workers there have not experienced a qualitative shift out of Group 1 in the twelve year 
period studied. This means that the four person family earning the minimum wage has not 
experienced any significant change in their ability to meet the EU’s twin goals over the last 
twelve years, an extraordinarily stable situation. In comparison, minimum wage workers in 
the UK, where the average number of hours necessary to earn the poverty threshold is about 
35 (Group 2), have experienced five qualitative shifts in their ability to fulfill the EU’s twin 
goals over the twelve year period studied moving from Group 2 to Group 3 and back again. 
Again, this indicates that those workers whose ability to achieve the twin goals is already 
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precarious, given higher necessary working hours, have also tended to experience less 
stability in the temporal value of the minimum wage over time.      
 In addition to examining qualitative change, I also created a more quantitative 
measure of the change in hours necessary to achieve the poverty threshold by measuring the 
volatility of working hours. Volatility
3
 is essentially a measure of how much change a 
particular value experiences over a given period of time. Volatility has been traditionally used 
as a measure of the riskiness of stocks; stocks with a higher volatility experience more 
change over time and are thus considered to be riskier. In the context of this project, the 
volatility score for each country will tell us the average absolute change in working hours 
required to earn the poverty threshold from year to year. To calculate volatility I took the 
standard deviation of the total number of hours necessary to achieve the poverty threshold 
over the period 1999-2011. Given that it is a standard deviation, this volatility score 
represents the number of hours changed (+/-) in 68.2% of the years studied, i.e. if the 
volatility score is .53, that means that in 68.2% of the years studied the number of hours 
necessary to earn the poverty threshold fluctuated by +/- .53 hours. The pattern that emerges 
from the gathered data shows that in fact the ability of minimum wage workers to earn the 
poverty level income is impacted by significant volatility over the measured period. The 
volatility of working hours is important to consider because, as mentioned earlier, in some 
cases even small changes in weekly working hours may negatively impact workers’ ability to 
meet the twin goals of minimal material prosperity and time sovereignty (i.e. small 
quantitative changes in the hours necessary to achieve the minimum wage can lead to 
qualitative changes in the ability of workers to achieve the twin goals of the EU). Of course, 
as a measure of change volatility tells us nothing about whether the changes being made are 
                                                          
3
 The riskiness of stocks, i.e. volatility “refers to the amount of uncertainty or risk about the size of changes in a 
security's value. A higher volatility means that a security's value can potentially be spread out over a larger 
range of values. This means that the price of the security can change dramatically over a short time period in 
either direction” (www.Investopedia.com). 
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beneficial to a minimum wage worker or not (e.g. a high volatility score could represent a 
significant increase or decrease in the number of hours a minimum wage worker must work 
in order to achieve the poverty threshold). However, what it does represent is how much the 
time necessary to achieve the poverty threshold has changed in the past and thus indicates 
how stable or unstable are the hours a minimum wage worker must work to achieve the 
poverty threshold. As such, with a high volatility score one cannot be sure what their ability 
to meet the EU's twin goals will be year to year, for better or worse, but rather that the 
possibility for change is great.  In order to measure this change, a volatility index was 
created. The results of this can be seen in Table 5 below.  
Table 5. Volatility Score and Average Hours Worked Weekly for Poverty Threshold (1999-
2011) 
 Country Single Worker Four Person Family 
Group A 
(Volatility <5% of 
standard 40-hour 
workweek) 
Belgium 0.58 (22.14) 1.22 (52.24) 
Romania 0.78 (24.34) 1.64 (56.85) 
Luxembourg 0.95 (33.28) 2.00 (76.53) 
Portugal 1.22 (27.35) 2.57 (64.29) 
Greece 1.23 (23.63) 2.59 (53.28) 
Netherlands 1.45 (23.84) 3.05 (56.02) 
Malta 1.62 (27.38) 3.39 (63.90) 
Ireland 1.67 (26.37) 3.50 (60.89) 
France 1.84 (18.71) 3.86 (47.54)  
Group B 
(Volatility 5-10%) 
United Kingdom 2.06 (35.53) 4.31 (79.93) 
Slovakia 2.19 (34.35) 4.59 (75.80) 
Spain 2.26 (31.75) 4.74 (73.74) 
Slovenia 2.36 (33.63) 4.95 (74.28) 
Poland 2.48 (25.15) 5.22 (56.49) 
Estonia 3.27 (35.41) 6.86 (78.03) 
Lithuania 3.74 (30.72) 7.85 (71.12) 
Group C 
(Volatility >10%) 
Latvia 4.09 (35.37) 8.58 (77.95) 
Hungary 4.19 (30.11) 9.23 (63.76) 
Czech Republic 5.06 (38.48) 10.62 (87.20) 
Bulgaria 7.71 (42.34) 16.20 (92.58) 
 *Average hours worked weekly over 1999-2011 in parentheses. 
To help explain these findings, countries can be organized into one of three groups 
describing the volatility experienced by minimum wage workers there. Group A is relatively 
stable and is defined by a volatility score that represents an average change of less than 5%, 
relative to a 40-hour workweek, or between 0 and 2 hours. The observed volatility scores in 
this group lie between .58 and 1.84 hours from year to year. Since the time required to 
achieve the poverty threshold is quite stable in Group A, if the average number of hours 
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necessary to earn the poverty threshold is not near the threshold for one of Groups described 
above (i.e. Groups 1, 2, or 3), there is very little possibility of these countries changing 
categories. For example, Belgium falls into Group A because it has a volatility score for a 
single worker of .58 hours which means that in 68% of the years sampled, the amount of time 
needed to achieve the poverty threshold fluctuated between +/- 35 minutes per week and that 
in 95% of the years sampled the amount of time needed to achieve the poverty threshold 
fluctuated between +/- 1.17 hours per week. The average weekly hours necessary to achieve 
the poverty threshold over the period of 1999-2011 in Belgium totals 22.14, leaving a 
minimum wage worker 17.86 hours per week free to dedicate to extra work if he or she 
wishes to earn income above the poverty threshold. This means that a change of 1.17 hours 
per week will not seriously affect the ability of minimum wage workers to fulfill the twin 
goals. Even an increase of 1.17 hours per week would not negatively impact a worker’s 
ability to a minimally decent standard of living while still retaining time sovereignty. In fact, 
if the average weekly hours necessary to achieve the poverty threshold equal 22, it would 
require the extremely unlikely increase of over 15 standard deviations to push single Belgian 
minimum wage workers into Group 2. In this sense, the situation of minimum wage workers 
in Belgium, like the situation of other countries in Group A, is remarkably stable.  
Group B includes those moderately unstable countries whose volatility score indicates 
an average change of between 5 and 10%, relative to a 40-hour workweek, or between 2 and 
4 hours. The observed volatility scores of countries in this category fall between 2.06 and 
3.74 hours from year to year. In Group B the number of hours required to earn the poverty 
threshold varies moderately from year to year, so minimum wage workers in these countries 
that are already close to a given threshold (e.g. reasonable, precarious, or unreasonable) could 
easily see a qualitative change in their ability to meet these twin goals. For example, the UK 
has a volatility score of 2.06 hours for a single worker which means that in 68% of the years 
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sampled the amount of time necessary to achieve the poverty threshold fluctuated by slightly 
more than +/- 2 hours per week and in 95% of the years sampled that same quantity of time 
fluctuated by slightly more than +/- 4 hours per week. Given that the average number of 
hours necessary to earn the poverty threshold in the UK for the sample period is 
approximately 35.5, that leaves just 4.5 hours free for the minimum wage worker to 
potentially increase his or her income above that of a poverty threshold. However, an increase 
of two standard deviations could be easily consumed by work that becomes necessary just to 
earn the poverty threshold. If this occurs the ability of these workers to meet the twin goals 
will be significantly negatively impacted such that it will become unreasonable. For countries 
in Group B, like the UK, this volatility, coupled with the relatively high number of hours they 
must work in order to achieve the poverty threshold, means that they can experience 
instability in their ability to meet the EU's twin goals.   
Group C includes those countries where the number of hours necessary to achieve the 
poverty threshold is severely unstable; this group is defined by having a volatility score that 
represents a change of greater than 10% relative to a 40-hour workweek, or change greater 
than 4 hours from year to year. The observed volatility scores for these countries lie between 
4.09 and 7.71. In Group C, the number of hours necessary to achieve the poverty threshold 
varies from year to year such that even countries where the average weekly hours necessary 
to earn the poverty threshold are moderate may be forced to fluctuate between the three 
groupings and those countries with already high average necessary hours (which 
disproportionately fill this category) may be forced into unreasonable situations. For 
example, Latvia, has a volatility index of 4.09 for a single worker, which means that in 68% 
of the years sampled it fluctuated between +/- 4 hours and 5 minutes and in 95% of the years 
sampled it fluctuated between +/- 8 hours and 10 minutes. Given that the average weekly 
working hours necessary to achieve the poverty threshold are 35, even a weekly change of 4 
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hours could push minimum wage workers to work more than 39 hours per week which would 
move them from Group 2 to Group 3, while a change of 8 hours would make achievement of 
the poverty threshold in this country nearly impossible. The situation in Bulgaria is even 
more striking: already in the unreasonable group for achievement of the poverty threshold, 
the volatility index for Bulgaria is 7.71, this means that in 68% of years sampled the hours 
necessary to achieve the poverty threshold fluctuated by +/- 7 hours and 43 minutes and in 
95% of years sampled the hours necessary fluctuated by +/- 15 hours and 26 minutes. 
Considering this change over the course of a year, minimum wage workers in Bulgaria could 
be subjected to working +/- 740.8 hours or 18.5 standard 40 hour workweeks just to obtain 
the poverty threshold.   
For a four person family the same groups (A, B, and C) apply and indicate similar 
situations, i.e. with the increasing volatility of Groups B and C countries are more likely to 
change categories. For Belgium, Romania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Malta, Ireland, and France we see relatively small volatility scores and thus relatively low 
risk of change in their ability to achieve the twin goals. For example, in the case of Belgium 
we see that the volatility index increases to 1.22 or about 1 hour and 13 minutes per week; 
split evenly between both workers, each would need to adjust their amount of work by about 
+/- 36 minutes. As in the case of a single worker, even an additional 36 minutes per week 
would not negatively impact their ability to achieve the poverty threshold or to retain time 
sovereignty; these workers still have time to find additional employment to increase their 
material prosperity or to dedicate to family or non-work activities. Because the temporal 
value of the minimum wage in these countries is quite stable over time, workers there are at 
very low risk for experiencing a change in their ability to achieve the twin goals.  
Families in the countries populating Group B, however, are potentially more 
negatively impacted by volatility and minimum wage workers in these countries that are 
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already close to a given threshold (e.g. reasonable, precarious, or unreasonable) could easily 
see a qualitative change in their ability to meet these twin goals. For example, in Latvia, the 
volatility index increases to 8.58, which means that in 68% of the years sampled the hours 
necessary to achieve the poverty threshold fluctuated +/- 8 hours and 35 minutes; in 98% of 
the years sampled the figure fluctuates twice that, 17 hours and 10 minutes. If the working 
couple splits this increase between them, each would need to adjust their amount of working 
hours by about 8 hours and 35 minutes per week or slightly more than 10 standard 40-hour 
workweeks over the course of year. This situation is extremely precarious given that the 
average weekly hours necessary to achieve the poverty threshold total about 78 per four 
person unit, or 39 per worker; any increase in the weekly working hours for these workers 
jeopardizes their time sovereignty and potentially even their ability to earn the minimal 
materially prosperous income.  
Group C includes those countries with the highest volatility index and minimum 
wage-earning families in these countries may be in a desperate situation. Families working in 
countries that populate this group may experience frequent qualitative changes in their ability 
to achieve the twin goals (e.g. fluctuation between Groups 1, 2, and 3) and those countries 
with already high average necessary hours (which disproportionately fill this category) may 
be forced into unreasonable situations. For example, Bulgaria’s volatility index is 16.2; this 
means that in 68% of years the weekly hours necessary to earn the poverty threshold 
fluctuated by +/-16 hours and 12 minutes; in 98% of years the fluctuation doubles to 32 hours 
and 24 minutes. Split between the dual earner couple, in 98% of years this translates into an 
adjustment of +/- 16 hours and 12 minutes per week, or just over 19 standard 40-hour 
workweeks per worker over the course of a year. The average weekly hours necessary to earn 
the poverty income for a four person family in Bulgaria is 92.6 which, split evenly between 
the two workers, is 46.3 hours per worker, less than 2 hours away from the very maximum 
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legal workweek allowed by the EU. The situation of these workers regarding fulfillment of 
the twin goals of minimal material prosperity and time sovereignty is already unreasonable 
and nearly impossible, but adding the instability created by the volatility of the temporal 
value of the minimum wage turns a bad situation into a desperate one.  
As mentioned above, in theory there is no reason why the total hours someone would 
have to work in order to achieve a poverty threshold should be correlated with how stable 
these hours are over time.  However, as was seen in my qualitative measure above, we find 
that for the most part, the groups used to describe the total hours worked for poverty 
threshold (reasonable Group 1, precarious Group 2, unreasonable Group 3) correlate strongly 
with the groupings based on  volatility (stable Group A, relatively unstable Group B, severely 
unstable Group C). This can be seen if we compare the groupings used in Table 1 with the 
volatility groups from Table 5. This comparison is offered in Table 6 below.  
  
Table 5. Poverty Country Groups and Volatility Scores 
  
Country  
Volatility Group 
Single Worker 
Volatility Group 
Four Person Family 
Poverty Group 1 
France A A 
Ireland A A 
Belgium A A 
Poland B B 
Greece A A 
Romania A A 
Netherlands A A 
Portugal A A 
Hungary C C 
Malta A A 
Poverty Group 2 
Lithuania B B 
Spain B B 
Latvia C C 
Luxembourg A A 
United Kingdom B B 
Slovenia B B 
Slovakia B B 
Estonia  B B 
Poverty Group 3 
Czech Republic C C 
Bulgaria C C 
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While there are some exceptions, the general pattern is that most countries in volatility Group 
A also fall into poverty Group 1. This means that in these countries the hours necessary to 
earn the poverty threshold are low (between 20 and 30 hours per week) and stable (less than 
2% change).  Most countries in volatility group B fall into poverty Group 2 with hours 
between 30 and 40 per week. In this case we find that countries that have precariously high 
working hours also experience moderate instability in the temporal value of the minimum 
wage. Finally, those countries in volatility group C also fall into poverty Group 3. In these 
countries the hours necessary to earn the poverty threshold are greater than 40 and severe 
volatility.   
From looking at these results we see that workers who could most benefit from 
stability of minimum wage levels, those in countries that fall into the precarious or 
unreasonable group, are subjected to the most unstable situation but that countries in the 
reasonable group, where working hours are relatively low, enjoy relative stability. In general, 
the countries with higher working hours have higher volatility scores and tend to experience 
more qualitative group changes and vice versa. Ultimately this means that minimum wage 
workers’ ability to fulfill the EU twin goals of minimal material prosperity and time 
sovereignty may be negatively impacted by unchecked volatility. It is difficult not to see the 
connections these results have to Polanyi’s fears of the instability of capitalism as a system – 
it is very clear here that the temporal value of the minimum wage is volatile in these countries 
and that volatility has real impacts on the ability of minimum wage workers to meet the 
threshold for minimal material prosperity and still retain some semblance of time 
sovereignty.  
Given that achievement of the twin goals of minimal material prosperity and time 
sovereignty are rights guaranteed to workers in the European Union, the ability of minimum 
wage workers to meet these goals should not fluctuate over time. The fact that achievement 
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of these twin goals does change over time for some workers is a problem and needs to be 
addressed.     
 
Conclusion 
 The most general goal of this project was to analyze the minimum wage in the 
European Union through the lens of time with two specific goals of determining whether 
minimum wage workers can in fact achieve the twin goals that the EU describes as rights and 
how that ability changes over time. In examining this issue, several patterns emerged, but 
each confirmed that, like both Marx and Polanyi argue, time is in fact an extremely important 
aspect of work, particularly minimum wage work. We have shown that the ability of 
minimum wage workers to reach the poverty threshold varies greatly between countries. 
Based on the ability of minimum wage workers to achieve the poverty threshold, countries 
fall into one of three groups based on whether it is reasonable, precarious, or unreasonable for 
minimum wage workers there to earn said threshold. These same groupings also generally 
correspond to the volatility groupings, i.e. the same countries that fall into the reasonable 
group for number of working hours also have a reasonable volatility index, while countries in 
Groups 2 and 3 with high working hours also fall into Groups B and C with high volatility. 
Given the volatility of working hours, minimum wage workers in the 20 EU countries with a 
national statutory minimum wage experience varying and sometimes limited ability to even 
achieve the poverty income; this is especially true for the four person family unit where the 
addition of two children greatly impacts the ability of the dual earner couple to reach the 
poverty threshold. This means that minimum wage workers in the EU experience varying 
ability to fulfill the all-important twin goals of minimal material prosperity and time 
sovereignty.  Ultimately, this demonstrates that the actual situation in the EU is not internally 
consistent with its rhetoric of the twin goals of minimal material prosperity and time 
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sovereignty; in some countries minimum wage workers are excluded from the right to have 
both a decent standard of living and time sovereignty.  
 So what does this all mean for minimum wage workers in the EU? Broadly, it means 
that in many countries, minimum wage workers are being left behind in the quest to fulfill the 
EU’s twin goals of minimal material prosperity and time sovereignty. In some countries 
(France, Ireland, Belgium, Poland, Greece, Romania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Hungary, 
and Malta) the minimum wage provides an adequate income such that workers are relatively 
easily able to fulfill the twin goals of minimal material prosperity and time sovereignty. 
These countries also tend to have low volatility indexes which means that their ability to 
maintain the twin goals over time stays relatively stable. However, minimum wage workers 
in a full half of EU countries with national statutory minimum wages (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom) are unable to reliably meet the twin goals – these workers are forced to give up 
one goal in order to expand the other.  Furthermore, it is these countries that often have high 
volatility indexes, signaling that the ability of minimum wage workers to maintain the twin 
goals may be threatened or even destroyed altogether given severe enough change in the 
temporal value of the minimum wage.  
Time is thus an essential component in the analysis of the minimum wage because it 
is a wage that is directly tied to a temporal value and focusing only on the monetary value of 
the minimum wage only shows us half of the picture. Using time as a lens through which to 
view the minimum wage allows us to uncover the other half of the picture and understand not 
only the material but the temporal situations of minimum wage workers. We see that not only 
is there significant material variation in the situation of minimum wage workers across the 
EU, but even in cases where material prosperity is similar there is temporal inequality that 
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would otherwise be invisible (e.g. comparing Belgium and Luxembourg where material 
prosperity is comparable but the temporal sacrifice to achieve that prosperity is different).  
The implications of this are great given that the minimum wage is specifically 
designed to be the lowest wage that still guarantees these twin goals. However, there are two 
issues to address based on this study: the ability of minimum wage workers to earn the 
poverty threshold and the volatility of that ability over time. In the cases of those countries 
where minimum wage workers are only precariously able or unable to achieve the poverty 
threshold – Latvia, Lithuania, Spain, Luxembourg, the UK, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, the 
Czech Republic, and Bulgaria – the twin goals are very clearly not being fulfilled and the 
situation there is not consistent with the rhetoric of the EU. In this case, a reevaluation and 
increase of the minimum wage level would be a logical solution. One option is to create a cap 
on the number of hours that any minimum wage worker should need to work to earn the 
poverty threshold and adjust the minimum wage accordingly.  
In order to address the second issue and curb the impact of volatility in these 
countries, it may be useful to take cues from the more stable countries in how they adjust 
their minimum wages. France provides a good example of a country with relatively low 
volatility and working hours; in this case, yearly upratings of the minimum wage are pegged 
to inflation and thus represent real and steady increases in income.  
This study is exploratory and theoretical and as such leaves considerable room for 
further questions and investigation. One important follow-up to this study would be to 
examine how the findings of this study affect minimum wage workers in practice. This would 
require determining exactly who are minimum wage workers in order to see whether these 
findings preponderantly affect particular social groups like women, migrant workers, etc. 
Given Marx’s assertions that capitalism eventually consumes all of a worker’s free time, 
another important line of inquiry would be to determine whether there is a correlation 
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between increased number of working hours and how "free" the market is. Further study 
should also extend this analysis to countries where the minimum wage is collectively 
bargained in order to determine the situation for those workers. Are minimum wage workers 
in countries where the minimum wage is determined by collective bargaining more likely to 
be able to achieve the twin goals than those workers in countries where the minimum wage is 
determined nationally? This is an important question. Finally, it would be beneficial to our 
understanding of the experience of minimum wage workers to compare the findings of this 
study with the levels of social support and welfare provided by each country, i.e. do countries 
where workers are not able to reach the poverty threshold have social provisions that lessen 
the negative impact of not achieving the twin goals? In sum, this project demonstrates the 
great importance of time, particularly for minimum wage workers whose wage is directly 
limited by temporal factors, and the need to continue examining this important aspect of 
work.  
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